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That’s no Moon.  It’s a space station.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Alone in the Moon-Sarang Mining Base, Sam Bell and 
faithful companion computer GERTY spend their time monitoring 
                                            
*
 B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, University of Southern California, 
2006; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; LL.M., International and Comparative 
Law, Cornell Law School, 2010.  I am grateful to the Cornell Law Library staff 
for being willing to indulge me with my research endeavors.  I would like to 
thank Professor Jens Ohlin for his guidance and encouragement, Professor 
Gregory Alexander for introducing me to new ways of thinking about property 
rights, and Richard Elkind for our continuing discussions on issues of space law. 
Of course I am eternally grateful for my wife who put up with me constantly 
discussing space law as I completed this piece.  Thank you. 
1
 Star Wars IV: A New Hope (1977). 
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the Helium-3 mining operation on the lunar surface.  Lunar 
Industries, who owns the lunar outpost, is the number one provider 
of clean energy to consumers on Earth, do to the hard work of the 
crew in the Moon-Sarang Mining Base.  Sounds like science 
fiction?  It is.  This is the context in which the main character of 
the recent movie Moon finds himself.2  But is a Moon base all that 
far off in the future? 
NASA and other agencies have shown a growing interest in 
establishing a lunar outpost similar to the one presented in the 
movie.3   In addition, the Obama administration has announced its 
commitment to sending humans to Mars and landing on an 
asteroid.4    With this commitment, President Obama has signaled a 
change in the United States’ approach to space exploration a 
change towards more private involvement in space development.  
A subtle shift away from government-run space programs is 
opening the door for private companies to pick up the torch of 
space exploration.5  In the 2011 NASA Fiscal Budget Overview, 
the agency pledges significant and sustained investment in “U.S. 
commercial spaceflight capabilities.”6  Charlie Bolden, NASA 
Administrator, reported: “NASA will accelerate and enhance its 
support for the commercial spaceflight industry to make travel to 
low Earth orbit and beyond more accessible and more affordable.”7  
Many commentators and legislators criticize the President’s move; 
however, they fail to recognize the growing potential for private 
companies to enter the game.  As one supporter opines: “To put it 
another way, it isn’t NASA’s job to put humans on Mars; it’s 
                                            
2
 Moon (2009). 
3
 The movie Moon was screened at NASA Space Center in Houston for 
scientists and engineers as part of a discussion on the topic of mining Helium-3 
from the Moon and creating a Moon base.  See Erin McCarthy, “Questions for 
Duncan Jones, Director of the Film Moon (With Video!),” Popular Mechanics, 
available at 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/4313243 
4
 Text of the President’s recent speech in Florida is available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/space/16nasa_text.html. 
5
 See Kenneth Chang, Obama Plans Florida Forum to Discuss NASA’s Future, 
NY Times (March 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/science/space/09nasa.html?ref=space 
(“The budget also seeks to nurture the commercial space industry by turning to 
private companies for transportation to the International Space Station and and 
to invest in new technologies to make future exploration of the solar system 
easier and cheaper.”) 
6NASA, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates available at 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420990main_FY_201_%20Budget_Overview_1_Feb_
2010.pdf 
7
 Statement by Charlie Bolden, NASA Administrator, NASA Budget Press 
Conference, February 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420994main_2011_Budget_Administrator_Remarks.p
df 
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NASA’s job to make it possible for the National Geographic 
Society, or an offshoot of the Latter-Day Saints, or an adventure 
tourism company, to put humans on Mars.”8 
Sustainable colonization and exploitation of the lunar 
surface, Mars, or near by asteroids is still decades away.  However, 
a simple Google search can reveal many websites and 
organizations claiming to sell land claims on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies.  One such organization called The Lunar Embassy 
claims to be “The largest organization of space enthusiasts 
worldwide, and the official founders and leader of the 
extraterrestrial real estate market.”9  The Lunar Embassy offers to 
sell a “Lunar Deed,” including the buyer’s name printed on the 
deed, for twenty-three U.S. dollars.10  The website ensures that 
“All properties have a prime view onto planet Earth.”11  These 
claims to lunar property are generally viewed by space scholars 
and lawyers as bogus.  The Ninth Circuit even affirmed a district 
court, which threw out a man’s property claim to an asteroid that 
he was trying to assert against NASA and the U.S. State 
Department.12  The International Institute of Space Law even 
issued, and recently re-issued, a statement attacking these claims as 
invalid and opining that claims to private property in outer space 
and on celestial bodies is prohibited by international law.13 
Unfortunately, the legal regime concerning the use of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies is largely unsettled.  First off, 
what counts as a celestial body is not defined in under law.14  The 
things that likely fall into the category of celestial bodies include 
planets, planetary satellites—like the Moon, astronomical objects, 
asteroids, comets, and stars.  It seems that celestial bodies 
                                            
8
 Rand Simberg, A Space Program for the Rest of Us, The New Atlantis, 
Number 25, Summer 2009, pp. 3-27, available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/a-space-program-for-the-rest-of-us. 
9
 Lunar Embassy World Headquarters, available at 
http://www.lunarembassy.com/ 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 See Gregor William Nemitz v. The United States of America et al. no. CV-N-
0300599-HDM (RAM), reported in Westlaw as 2003 WL 24268455 (D. Nev.) 6 
Nov. 2003; WL 3703798 (D. Nev.) 28 Jan. 2004, WL 3703805, 11 Feb. 2004; 
2004 WL 3167042, 26 Ap. 2004. (affirmed 126 Fed. Appx. 343; 2005 US App. 
LEXIS 2350 (9th Cir., 7 Feb. 2005). 
13
 Statement of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space 
Law, International Institute of Space Law, (March 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf. 
14
 See generally FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 
175-79 (2009 Ashgate).  The International Astronomical Union (IAU) is 
recognized as the authority responsible for naming and categorizing celestial 
bodies.  One famous instance of their work was when they adopted a definition 
of “planet” that excluded Pluto from the family of planets in our solar system.  
Id. 
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encompasses all extraterritorial, physical objects hurdling through 
outer space.  Given the ensuing rise in private ventures into outer 
space and onto other celestial bodies in our solar system, the set of 
rights that will protect those private ventures should be clearly 
defined.  However, these ambiguities that exist in the status of 
property rights in international space law, primarily under the 
widely accepted Outer Space Treaty,15 both in the ownership of 
minerals removed from the land, and ownership of the land it self.  
The land and the resources found within that land are what carries 
the value and incentive for future exploration, settlement, and 
ultimately exploitation.  Private enterprises often claim that the 
ambiguity regarding the status of property rights on celestial 
bodies is a major barrier to commercial development.  Commercial 
development requires large amounts of financing, and the 
ambiguities prevent effective financing and deprives them of 
assurance that their investments will be protected.  There is also a 
risk that private actors bring resources back to Earth from the 
Moon or other celestial bodies will be faced with confiscation of 
the material.16 
Resolving the status of property rights on other celestial 
bodies is a complicated one.  This Paper focuses on the issues 
related to territorial property rights on celestial bodies.  There are 
many types of property rights that are involved with commercial 
development in outer space.  For instance, orbital rights, 
intellectual property rights and commercial transactions are other 
areas in which the law regarding property rights in space need to 
be developed.17  Most current activities in space occur in Earth 
orbit.  Ventures like Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic that are 
currently concerned with suborbital human flights for space 
tourism, are not concerned with territorial property rights on let say 
the moon.  Industries that would be interested in territorial property 
rights are those that plan to land on celestial bodies and establish a 
permanent presence on that body.  These companies would include 
lunar hotels, mining ventures, manufacturers and energy 
producers—similar to the fictitious company in the movie Moon.  
These types of companies face far more hurdles to viability than 
                                            
15
 See discussion infra at Part II.A. 
16
 Authors describe a scenario where a company contemplated landing returning 
space vehicles from the Moon in Australia.  The company backed off after 
discovering that Australia was a signatory to the Moon Treaty and feared that 
Australian authorities might confiscate any material brought back to Earth under 
a “common heritage” argument.”  Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans G. von der 
Dunk, Bringing Space law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without 
Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 92 (2005-2006). 
17
 See generally Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space 
law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 81, 92 (2005-2006). 
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private property rights in celestial territory; nonetheless, once these 
companies do become viable, these issues will need to have been 
sorted out. 
Outer space and all the resource contained within it, besides 
those on Earth, have been proclaimed as having value to all of 
humanity.  All the international agreements and proclamations 
have this theme.  This desire thus underlies the basis for all space 
law and serves the overarching principle.  Some claim that this 
principle precludes the private property rights in space, because 
they are inconsistent with the good of community, but this is not 
so.  Private property rights incentivize innovation and productive 
use, that will in turn benefit society as a whole.  Private rights 
allow for individual efforts to flourish.  Nonetheless, the 
overarching principle of shared benefit must somehow influence 
the manner and extent to which private property rights are 
exercised. 
There is substantial disagreement over whether private 
property rights are permissible under the current space law regime 
or whether they should be recognized at all.  Alan Wasser proposes 
that private property rights are permissible under the current 
regime even though state sovereignty over land on celestial bodies 
is prohibited.  Thomas Gangale firmly repudiates Wasser’s claims 
and points to the lack of national sovereignty as fatal to any claim 
of private property rights on celestial bodies.  And Wayne White 
proposes a theory of “functional” property rights. 
Although there is a convincing argument that the current 
Outer Space Treaty allows for limited, “functional” private 
property rights, expressing them in an international treaty is best to 
ensure security for developing private ventures.  This paper 
proposes a middle ground between the advocates for private 
property and these that wish to keep outer space and celestial 
bodies the common heritage of mankind.  This middle way 
proposes the recognition and protection of private property rights; 
however, these private property rights would be intrinsically 
limited by a social-obligation norm that would comport with the 
“common heritage of mankind” goals enshrined in current space 
law.  Internal social-obligation norms exist in legal systems around 
the globe and serve as a way to balance individual property rights 
with the good of society.18  This is a different mode of property 
theory, which diverges from the Blackstonian view of ownership 
that holds out the owner as king.19 
                                            
18
 The South African Constitution is a prime example. 
19
 “Sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.”  Blackstone. 
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Defining private property rights on celestial bodies with an 
inherent social obligation norm will allow us to characterize 
celestial bodies as terra nullius, incentivizing a race to develop and 
acquire resources, while preserving the essential aspects of the 
terra communis aspirations enshrined in most of space law.  The 
social obligation norm will accomplish this feat by internalizing 
the external costs to the community, namely wasteful uses and 
undesirable consumption.  The ability to force actors on celestial 
bodies to internalize the undesirable externalities to the community 
will bridge the divide between the two opposing camps and 
provide a robust framework of celestial property rights on which to 
build.  
Part II of this paper will lay out the current legal regime 
governing activities and property right in outer space and on other 
celestial bodies.  In so doing, the relevant treaty provisions will be 
presented and analyzed.  Next in Part III, this paper will presented 
various argues for and against private property rights based on the 
current outer space legal regime, concluding with an assessment of 
the debate as a whole.  Part IV will then look to the two terrestrial 
legal regimes that deal with extraterritorial property that are most 
often used as viable analogies for space law reform.  Each analogy 
will be critique and the inadequacies of each regime will be 
highlighted.  Finally in Part V, this paper will advocate for the 
creation of a new space law treaty, namely a “Property Treaty” that 
specifically deals with the issue of property rights.  This proposed 
treaty will provide for the substance of outer space property rights 
which should include a social-obligation norm to best comport 
with the general common heritage of mankind doctrines found 
through the outer space legal regime. 
 
II. THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME: RELEVANT TREATY 
PROVISIONS 
 
 The legal regime governing activities in outer space is 
made up of a number of treaties.  The two most relevant treaties 
dealing with property right in outer space and on celestial bodies, 
like the Moon and Mars, are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon 
Treaty. 
 
A. Outer Space Treaty 
 
 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, or Outer Space Treaty,20 serves as the 
                                            
20
 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (1968) 610 
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foundation for international space law.  It has been described as the 
Magna Carta of Space.21  It is made up of seventeen articles 
broadly addressing issues of sovereignty, liability, safety, 
information disclosure, exploration, use, and militarization in outer 
space and on celestial bodies.  The chapeau of the treaty 
emphasizes that the treaty is designed to further the goals of the 
United Nations Charter, such as the preservation of peace.22  First 
signed and brought into force in 1967, it is the most widely 
accepted of the space treaties.  As of the start of 2008, ninety-eight 
countries have signed onto and ratified the treaty.  Every space-
faring nation has signed the treaty.  Because of its wide 
acceptance, it is safe to consider some of the general principles as 
also representing customary international law. 
 The treaty contains key provisions that are relevant to the 
discussion of property rights and sovereignty in outer space and on 
other celestial bodies.  Article I proclaims, “The exploration and 
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries [. . .].”23  It goes on to state: “Outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and 
use by all States [. . .] on a basis of equality [. . .], and there shall 
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”24    Article II of the 
treaty states: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means.”25  This provision prohibits any nation from staking a claim 
by any means to any part of space or any celestial body like the 
Moon, Mars or asteroids.  The thrust of these provisions is to 
firmly establish a community interest in the use of outer space and 
the celestial bodies. 
Articles VI and VII provide that states must take 
responsibility for the actions of their nationals in space.   Article 
VI mandates that “States [. . .] shall bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried 
on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities [. . 
.].”26  The provision goes on to state: “The activities of non-
governmental entities [. . .] shall require authorization and 
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the 
                                                                                                  
UNTS 205; (1968) UKTS 10, Cmnd. 3519; 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347; 6ILM 
386; 61 AJIL 644: in force 10 October 1967. [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
21
 LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 53. 
22
 Outer Space Treaty, chapeau. 
23
 Outer Space Treaty, art. I (1968) (emphasis added). 
24
 Outer Space Treaty, art. I (1968). 
25
 Outer Space Treaty, art. II (1968) (emphasis added). 
26
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VI. 
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Treaty.”27  Article VII confers international liability onto a state 
that “launched or procures the launching of an object into outer 
space” and a state from “whose territory or facility an object is 
launched” for damage to another state party either on earth, in 
outer space, or on another celestial body.28 
Article VIII discusses the ownership and control of objects 
launched into space.  It states in relevant part that: 
 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry an object launched into outer 
space is carried shall retain 
jurisdiction and control over such 
object, and over any personnel 
thereof, while in outer space or on a 
celestial body.  Ownership of objects 
launched into outer space, including 
objects landed or constructed on a 
celestial body, and of their 
component parts, is not affected by 
their presence in outer space or on a 
celestial body or by their return to 
the Earth.  (Emphasis added).29 
 
This provision is key in the discussion of property rights in 
space and on celestial bodies.  This provision ensures that 
ownership and control over objects and persons is not affected by 
their presence in outer space or on a celestial body.  These 
ownership rights are even preserved when the objects land or are 
constructed on a celestial body.30 
Control and use of installations and vehicles in outer space 
is limited by the guiding principles of cooperation and non-
exclusion.  The Outer Space Treaty limits all activities in space to 
those that do not unjustifiably interfere with the uses by other 
states.  Article IX is a type of “nuisance” provision in that it 
provides that:  
 
In the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, States [. . .] shall be 
guided by the principle of 
cooperation and mutual assistance 
and shall conduct all their activities 
                                            
27
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VI. 
28
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VII. 
29
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VIII. 
30
 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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[. . .] with due regard to the 
corresponding interests of all other 
States Parties to the Treaty.31 
 
States must act in a manner in which is amenable to the 
uses of other states.  In addition, Article XII mandates that “All 
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other 
States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.”32  This 
provision severely limits the right to exclude from the collection of 
ownership rights attaching to an installation or vehicle.  Again, the 
Outer Space Treaty is establishing a strong community interest in 
the uses of outer space. 
Under the Outer Space Treaty, it is debatable whether 
celestial bodies fall under either the paradigm of terra nullius or 
terra communis.33  The three fundamental principles regarding 
land beyond national sovereignty are traditionally: terra communis, 
terra nullis, and the Common Hertiage of Mankind.34 Within terra 
communis the area is a commons thus any individual is free to 
explore, exploit and use the area and its resources.35 All comers are 
treated equally and there is no room for exclusive property rights.36  
Res communis is usually applied to resources that are available in 
abundance or are significantly remote that conflicts are unlikely—
an example being the “freedom of the seas.”37  Res nullius is the 
principle that the commons belong to no one and may be 
apportioned to the exclusion of others.38  The Common Heritage of 
Mankind principle finds its roots in the principle of res communis 
and is sometimes referred to as res communis humanitatus.39  The 
Common Hertiage of Mankind principle is considered to have a 
strong and weak version.  The strong version of the principle goes 
further than the res communis principle—sometimes called res 
communis plus40—and requires the sharing of benefits in an 
equitable and just manner.41  The weak version simply holds that 
the common heritage principle is a modern version of the res 
communis principle and that the strong version is not supported by 
                                            
31
 Outer Space Treaty, art. IX. 
32
 Outer Space Treaty, art. XII. 
33
 See generally LOTTA VIIKARI, FROM MANGANESE NODULES TO LUNAR 
REGOLITH 17-21 (Publications of the Faculty of Law, University of Lapland, D 
Series, Rovaniemi 2002). 
34
 CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 290 (1991). 
35
 VIIKARI supra note 33, at 17-18. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 CHRISTOL supra note 34, at 291. 
41
 VIIKARI supra note 33, at 19. 
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international law.  Only the Moon Treaty and UNCLOS proclaim 
certain areas to be common heritage, but none contain specific 
definition of the concept.42  Given this lack of content and 
definition, the common heritage principle is not itself a legal 
principle, but a principle that symbolizes aspirations of cooperation 
and guidance in determining future legal rules.43   
The principle of space benefitting all mankind suggests that 
terra communis controls.  It has also claimed that the Moon and 
other celestial bodies are res extra commercium, which was a 
Roman legal concept that a thing or right cannot be owned or 
devolved through succession.44  It is debatable whether outer space 
is res extra commercium because this actually begs the question of 
whether private property rights are even permissible in space.  The 
overarching principle of protecting the interests of all mankind 
does not preclude the land from being terra nullius, because the 
principle can be enshrined in the very substance of private property 
rights as argued in this paper.  The principle neither mandates that 
celestial bodies are terra communis. 
Some of the principles expressed in the Outer Space Treaty 
have passed from simply binding signatories to the treaty, but into 
customary international law that binds all nations generally.45  The 
ideas expressed in the Outer Space Treaty were reaffirmations of a 
number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, which gives the 
first indication that they might form a basis of international 
customary law.46  The specific provisions of the treaty that have 
passed into customary law include at least:47 the principle that 
international law applies in outer space,48 the prohibition against 
national appropriation of outer space or any celestial body by any 
means,49 the principle that outer space is free for exploration,50 the 
mandate that states are responsible for their, and their national’s 
action in outer space,51 states are liable for damage they cause to 
                                            
42
 See Moon Treaty, art. 11.1 and UNCLOS, art. 136. 
43
 VIIKARI supra note 33, at 21. 
44
 LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 184.  
45
 Persistent objectors may not be bound to customary international norms unless 
the norm is part of jus cogens. 
46
 International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGA Res. 
1721 (XVI), 20 December 1961; International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, UNGA Res. 1802 (XVII) 19 December 1962.  Declaration of 
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, UNGA Res. 1962 (XVIII) 1963 (1964) 3 ILM 157. 
47
 For a full discussion on the status of the principles in the Outer Space Treaty 
see LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 70-80. 
48
 Outer Space Treaty, art. III. 
49
 Outer Space Treaty, art. II. 
50
 Outer Space Treaty, art. I. 
51
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VI. 
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other states,52 and most importantly that the use and exploration of 
outer space is for the benefit of all mankind.53  Therefore, 
withdrawing from the treaty would not avail a nation from being 
bound by its principles.54 
 
B. Moon Treaty 
 
 In contrast to the widely accepted Outer Space Treaty, the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies,55 or Moon Treaty, has not been accepted 
by any space-faring nation.56  Ratified as an addition to the Outer 
Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty was an attempt to reassert and 
expand the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” in to 
space exploration and exploitation.  The treaty was created to 
apply to the uses of resources found on the Moon in a similar way 
that the law of the sea applied to resources on the sea floor.  The 
Moon Treaty’s provisions substantially overlap with the Outer 
Space Treaty’s provisions.  Its lack of acceptance is evidence that 
either many states saw the Moon Treaty as repetitive of the Outer 
Space Treaty or that they did not agree with the stronger emphasis 
on the common heritage of all mankind. 
 Article 11 provides that “Neither the surface nor the 
subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources 
in place, shall become property of any State, international 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national 
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural 
person.”57  The same article begins with the proclamation that 
“[t]he Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind [. . .].”58  The article also reaffirms the prohibition on 
national appropriation on the Moon and other celestial bodies 
echoing the Outer Space Treaty.59 
 The Moon Treaty’s provisions probably do not reflect 
customary norms beyond those already present in the Outer Space 
Treaty.  The weak support of the Treaty shows that states either 
                                            
52
 Outer Space Treaty, art. VII. 
53
 Outer Space Treaty, art. I. 
54
 See 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 38; see also North Sea Continental Shelf, 
1969 ICJ Rep. 1. 
55
 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, UN Doc. A/34/664. Nov. 1979; UN Doc. A/34/20, Annex 2; UN Doc. 
A/RES/34/68; 1363 UNTS 3; (1979) 18 ILM 1434: in force 11 July 1984. 
[hereinafter Moon Treaty]. 
56
 As of 2008, only thirteen states have ratified the treaty.  France, Guatemala, 
India, and Romania have signed, but not ratified the treaty.  It has been 
speculated that Australia might secede from the treaty. 
57
 Moon Treaty, art. 11(3). 
58
 Moon Treaty, art. 11(1). 
59
 Moon Treaty, art. 11(2). 
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consider it superfluous or do not agree with the provisions.  
However, the Moon Treaty is a persuasive document that can be 
gleaned for certain principles that evince the desires of developing 
countries.  Its application to this discussion is limited. 
 
III. ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
CURRENT REGIME? 
 
The Outer Space Treaty has attained such wide acceptance 
and has survived for so long that it would be unwise to advocate 
for its abrogation or extensive change.  If it is possible to work 
within the current framework, it is preferable to do so rather than 
reconstruct a new legal framework with large transaction costs.  To 
this end, it is necessary to determine whether claims to private 
property rights on the Moon or other celestial bodies are consistent 
and permissible under the current framework—namely the Outer 
Space Treaty.  From the beginning, it is important to note that 
Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Law of Treaties mandates that, “A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose.”60  There are three 
principle positions regarding the question of private property rights 
under the current regime. The first position simply states that 
private property rights are consistent with the current legal regime 
because they are not explicitly prohibited by treaty, and states can 
and should recognize those rights.  The second position posits that 
the treaty allows states to exercise “functional” sovereignty, which 
allows for a little set of property rights based on occupation and 
use.  Finally, the third position states that private property rights 
are not consistent with the current legal regime because they are 
implicitly prohibited, and real property rights are unnecessary in 
the outer space regime. 
 
A. Yes, Private Property Rights are Permissible 
 
Alan Wasser, the Chairman of The Space Settlement 
Institute, is a vocal proponent of private property rights on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies.  He argues that private property is 
not explicitly excluded within the Outer Space Treaty; therefore, it 
is permissible for private actors to claim property rights on 
celestial bodies.61  He relies on the legal doctrine of expressio unis 
                                            
60
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, 155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(1969). 
61
 Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and 
International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It 
Needs to Survive, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37 (2008). 
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est exclusio, or the doctrine that when interpreting a statute, one 
should presume that provisions not mentioned were excluded by 
deliberate choice, not mistake.62  He interprets Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty narrowly as only applying to nations because it 
does not explicitly prohibit property claims by private actors.63 
Wasser primarily relies on a Lockean-type theory of obtaining 
property rights that is independent of any sovereign.64  The natural 
law principle of pedis possessio or “use and occupation” is the 
theoretical basis for his property claims on celestial bodies.65  He 
finds this precedent in civil law traditions based on Roman law and 
admits that this theory of property rights does not comport the 
common law standard.66    Wasser claims that since the Outer 
Space Treaty does not explicitly prohibit a nation from recognizing 
a property claim, then such recognition is permissible.67  
Therefore, nations can only recognize, not confer, rights under 
current space law.  He rebuts claims that recognition of property 
claims would be an act of national appropriation prohibited under 
Article II by clarifying that recognition of extraterritorial claims is 
not the same as asserting authority over the property.68  He 
highlights the fact that U.S. courts recognize and defend property 
rights not subject to U.S. sovereignty.69  Wasser and others like 
Wayne N. White70 exploit the distinction between property and 
sovereignty.  He also points out that Articles VI, VII, and VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty do not turn private actors into branches or 
parts of the state just by the fact that the state authorizes and 
oversees their activities.71 
What would property rights look like under Wasser’s 
regime?  Rights holders would not have a full set of property 
rights.  For example, the right to exclude would be abrogated by 
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty—requiring all stations and 
installations must be open to representatives of other state—as well 
as the “benefit of all” language in Article I.  How much land can 
be claimed?  Answer: the amount of land that a settlement can, and 
must, use depends on what the land is being used for and how 
much land the settlement will need to survive.72 
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 Id. at 47. 
63
 Id. at 43-48. 
64
 Id. at 48-49. 
65
 See “Pedis possessio,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. 
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 Wasser & Jobes, supra note 51, at 48-50. 
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 Id. at 47-48. 
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 Id. at 54-55. 
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 Id. at 54-55. 
70
 THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 33 (2009). 
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14 DEVELOPING THE FINAL FRONTIER [Aug. 16, 2010] 
 
This position suffers from a fatal theoretical flaw.  It is 
theoretically true that property rights can exist independent of a 
government or sovereign.  However, for those rights to have any 
meaning, a group or community must agree to recognize those 
rights.  A holder of property rights can only “enforce” those rights 
if the rest of the community agrees to back him up.  To have legal 
status, the property rights must be recognized by the sovereign, 
which would be the government or community in which the 
property rights holder chooses to enforce his rights.  If the 
community does not recognize the property rights, then the 
community will not entertain a claim to enforce those rights.  In 
the space context, it would be necessary for the international 
community or individual states to recognize the property rights for 
a rights holder to ever make a claim.  And here Wasser has not 
shown that the community has back up his claim. 
 
B. Yes, But Only a Limited Set of “Functional” Property 
Rights 
 
Functional property rights are a kind of property right 
distinguishable from real property rights.  This is the argument that 
states that have jurisdiction and control over a facility or vehicle 
can exercise dominion over the facilities that are attached or 
constructed onto the celestial land, can be exercised over an area 
and for a period determined by occupation and use.  This control 
and dominion is described as “functional” property rights.73   
Wayne N. White advocates that this limited form of “functional 
sovereignty” would allow for a form of property rights because it 
is distinct from territorial sovereignty.74 Problem of interplanetary 
fixtures: A fixture is a chattel that has been fixed to land and thus 
has ceased being personal property and has become part of realty.  
Fixtures pass with the ownership of the land they sit on.  The 
purpose of the attachment generally controls whether it is part of 
the real property or chattel.  The party wishing to make a chattel a 
fixture to the land must have an objective intention to make the 
chattel part of the land. 
 
C. No, Private Property Rights are not Consistent with the 
Legal Regime 
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 GANGALE supra note 60, at 44-49. 
74
 Wayne N. White, “Real Property Rights in Outer Space,” Proceeding, 40th 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1998, American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, available at 
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Private property rights are not permissible because Article 
II of the Outer Space Treaty forbids state appropriation, which is 
needed for the recognition of private property ownership.  The 
simplest form of this argument proceeds as follows:75 Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty states that non-governmental entities, 
which include private parties, are the responsibilities of their 
representative states.  This essentially makes private activity into 
national activity.  One such national activity is national 
appropriation, which is expressly prohibited in Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty.  Therefore, private entities cannot appropriate 
celestial land.   
Also, even if individuals “claimed” property on celestial 
bodies, that claim would need to be recognized by a sovereign for 
it to be enforceable.76  Thomas Gangale finds that any reading of 
Articles II and VI of the Outer Space Treaty that finds that there is 
no prohibition on private property is incorrect. Gangale points to 
the language of Article II which states “by any other means” as 
going beyond only actions of states and covering private property 
rights.  Therefore, he finds that the “national appropriation” 
provision was meant to be all-inclusive.77  The Outer Space Treaty 
did not set up a public/private dichotomy for space related 
actions.78  Nations are responsible for the activities of their private 
nationals, and therefore must prevent those private actors from 
violating the treaty regime.79  If this were not so, then nations 
would be able to direct their private nationals to do what the state 
could not do on its own.80  Some commentators also point to 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the exclusive 
use of large tracts of celestial land because these claims would 
interfere with the “free access” by all states.81  Where there are no 
laws, there are no rights. 
At the core of the argument, Gangale advocates that real 
property rights are not necessary in the outer space legal regime.82  
He finds that Article I provides for the free use of celestial bodies 
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 Statement by the Board of Directors * Of the International Institute of Space 
Law (IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding The Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, International Institute of Space Law, (2004) available at 
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by all states.  This “free use” ability is limited by the other 
provisions of the treaty, but also allows certain activities.  For 
instance, Article II prohibits appropriation thus an extensive and 
perpetual right to use is impermissible.  However, the “free use” 
provision doe not mean that all appropriation of any kind is 
prohibited, but that a limited form of appropriation is permissible.  
Simply put, prospective claims to wide swaths of resources and 
land are prohibited by the treaty.  Thus the right of use is confined 
to the area and time of an ongoing operation, and the in situ 
utilization of resources is permitted.  This is also a Lockean-type 
theory of ownership or property rights because ownership springs 
out of mixing labor with resources.  Extracting the resource makes 
it yours.  Gangale finds an analogy in law of the sea83 context.84  
He states that the celestial bodies of space are res communis and 
extraction from them is like plucking fish from the sea—the fish 
belong to humanity until the fisherman’s labor removes the fish 
from the res communis.  Therefore, there is no need for real 
property rights because these “use” rights would suffice. 
 
D. Analysis of Positions 
 
White’s argument that a certain set of “functional” private 
property rights are permissible in space is likely most accurate and 
appropriate for the further development of space and its resources.  
Wasser’s position, that private actors can obtain rights to a large 
plot of real property seems untenable and to run contrary to 
overarching principle of shared benefits in space law.  His position 
advocates from broad private property rights over land that is not 
actively being used, but is prospective.  This seems to be no more 
valid of a claim than the claims of companies that purport to sell 
land claims on the moon.  There must be more than a simple 
proclamation of ownership; there must be some active element 
involved.  On the other end of the spectrum, Gangle’s theory reads 
the prohibitions on national apportionment too broadly.  It seems 
unreasonable that no private rights are permissible even when an 
individual puts their own investment and labor into the acquisition 
of the property.  This complete prohibition on private property 
rights in extraterritorial property is not found in any of the other 
legal regimes, namely the law of the sea and the Antarctic treaty 
system. 
The functional approach to private property rights in space 
best balances the interests of the private entity and the interests of 
the global community in the resources of the universe.  It allows 
claims to rights only in that which is actually being used, not to 
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property “as far as the eye can see.”  Nonetheless, because the 
legal regime currently stands, there is too much ambiguity and no 
court or body to clarify the provisions.  Therefore some 
clarification on whether private enterprises will be able to invest in 
establishing settlements or other operations on celestial bodies with 
the guarantee that those investments will be protected by a set of 
property rights.  Many advocate that we look to terrestrial legal 
regimes as providing useful analogies that can help resolve the 
ambiguities in the outer space regime. 
 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL PROPERTY THEORY—INADEQUATE 
MODELS FOR SPACE 
 
 Taking a step back, extraterritorial property rights pose a 
unique problem for any legal regime.  These legal questions arises 
out of the use and exploitation of resources beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of any one state.  Thus, absent international agreement, 
there is no body of “law” that protects the rights of actors in the 
extraterritorial space.  The best examples of legal regimes 
addressing the problem of extraterritorial property rights are the 
Law of the Sea Convention and the Antarctic treaty regime.  Many 
commentators on the subject of property rights in outer space try to 
use terrestrial legal schemes as analogies to the outer space 
problems.  Although they are useful guides to glean important 
methods of dealing with extraterritorial property rights, they do not 
adequately translate to the outer space context. 
 Before presenting a possible solution to the problem of 
private property rights in space, it seems fair to address the various 
legal regimes that are used as fodder to propose ways of instituting 
private property rights in outer space.  In this section, the two most 
heavily relied upon regimes mentioned above will be presented as 
they relate to the issue of extraterritorial property rights.  Only 
those provisions that most relate to the issue will be considered—
leaving out the vast majority of each legal regime.  Along with 
presenting the two legal regimes, various arguments of how these 
regimes could be translated into the outer space context will be 
presented.  Finally, this section will end with a critique of why 
these analogies ultimately fail at addressing the heart of the matter. 
 
A. Terrestrial Legal Regimes 
 
i. The Law of the Sea 
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 The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)85 generally governs the activities and sovereignty of 
states on and in the ocean, and specifically addresses the 
sovereignty and rights of states in relation to the resources in high 
seas and the seabed.  The treaty, the third incarnation of a serious 
of treaties, is highly successful; one-hundred sixty nations, as well 
as the European Union, have signed and ratified the treaty.  Many 
of its provisions codified customary international norms and many 
of the treaty provisions have become apart of customary law.   
 Part XI of UNCLOS is devoted to the exploitation of the 
deep seabed and the ocean floor.86  Part XI specifically addresses 
issues relating to the exploitation of minerals on the seabed outside 
a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),87 the region called 
“the Area.”88  The treaty designates this area “the common heritage 
of mankind.”89  UNCLOS required that all profit received from the 
exploitation of the seabed must be shared with the developing 
countries of the world. UNCLOS generally prohibits any “claim or 
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor appropriation” over 
“the Area or its resources.”90  Part XI also went so far as to create 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA)91 which had the power to 
license and regulate the exploitation of the ocean floor,92 as well as 
collect and distribute seabed mining royalties.93  Exercise of any 
rights relating to the extraction, acquisition or claim to any 
resources in the Area must be in accordance with UNCLOS, and 
the rules, regulations, and procedures of the ISA.94  This provision 
hindered the U.S. from ratifying the treaty; nonetheless, the U.S. 
accepted most of UNCLOS as customary law, except for Part XI.  
Subsequently, the 1994 Agreement95 sought to address some of the 
concerns of the U.S. over the provisions in Part XI, by suspending 
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the limitation on seabed production96 and mandatory technology 
transfer.97 
 Rosanna Sattler advocates for transfer of the concept of the 
EEZ into the outer space regime.98  She proposes that states be 
given or declare an EEZ on celestial bodies.  Once declared or 
acquired, they would enjoy the same privileges a costal state 
enjoys in its EEZ under UNCLOS, namely the exclusive right to 
exploit, control, and manage resources within its zone.  The nation 
would be able to license rights to private enterprises to exploit the 
resources within each nation’s EEZ on the celestial body.  This 
argument may fit within the outer space legal regime forbidding 
national appropriation because under the UNCLOS EEZ regime, 
costal states do not have full sovereignty over their EEZ, but a set 
of conferred sovereign rights.  The distinction is most clear by 
comparing the complete sovereignty available to costal sates 
within their territorial sea,99 which includes criminal jurisdiction 
and other traditional forms of sovereignty, and the limited rights 
available to the costal state in the EEZ.  The EEZ is essentially the 
high seas—under no state’s jurisdiction or control—except for the 
fact that the costal state has more privileges to natural resources 
within the zone than all other states.  Therefore, establishing EEZs 
on a celestial body would not be an actual conferral of sovereignty, 
but simply a conferral of rights against other states, possibly 
avoiding the prohibition on national appropriation. 
 
ii. Antarctica 
 
The Antarctic Treaty is the primary treaty representing the 
guiding principles and standards for activities in Antarctica.  The 
Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 and went into force in 1961.  
The original twelve consultative nations have expanded to twenty-
eight consultative nations by the year 2000.  Forty-six nations have 
now signed onto the Treaty.  The Treaty strives to ensure that 
Antarctica will be used solely for peaceful purposes.  The 
Antarctic Treaty treats the issue of national sovereignty in Article 
IV where is assures that nothing in the treaty renounces or 
diminishes previous claims to sovereignty in Antarctic, but 
prohibits new claims of sovereignty while the Treaty is in force.  
The provision needs in relevant part: 
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No acts or activities taking place 
while the present Treaty is in force 
shall constitute a basis for asserting, 
supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial 
sovereignty shall be asserted while 
the present Treaty is in force.100 
 
 Article VIII of the Treaty states that personnel in Antarctica 
remain under the jurisdiction of their own states.101  The substance 
of the Antarctic Treaty primarily focuses on scientific and 
exploratory activities.  The legal framework applying to 
commercial exploitation has taken a different stance than in the 
law of the sea context. 
 In 1991 the Madrid Protocol102 prohibited all forms of 
commercial exploitation except for tourism.  All mineral 
exploitation is banned for fifty years after the protocol went into 
force, and the ban can only be lifted by unanimous consent of all 
the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid 
Protocol.103  A separate treaty, the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,104 was drafted to apply to 
mining activities on the continent; however, the treaty was never 
ratified. 
 The legal status of Antarctica under the Antarctica Treaty 
is uncertain given the fact that the treaty allows for previous claims 
of national sovereignty to remain valid, but forbids further 
appropriations.  Some claim that the Antarctica Treaty declared the 
continent to be common property or terra communis.  Terra 
communis is common territory to which no state can claim 
sovereignty put the land and resources belong to humanity as a 
whole.105  The terra communis paradigm does not correctly fit onto 
the Antarctic legal regime because, under Article IV of the 
Antarctica Treaty, a number of states can and still do uphold their 
claims to sections of the continent.106  The paradigm of terra 
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nullius also does not comport with the legal regime and state 
practice.  Terra nullius, meaning land belonging to no one, is land 
that is not subject to any sovereign and can be acquired by simple 
occupation.  Article IV of the treaty also prohibits any new claims 
to sovereignty; however, the pre-existing claims to the continent 
were must likely based on a theory of Antarctica being terra 
nullius.  Therefore, the legal status of the continent  is uncertain. 
 
B. The Inadequacy of the Terrestrial Regimes to Address 
the Problem 
 
On a basic level, the law of the sea and the Antarctic treaty 
system are an inadequate analogies to the outer space legal system 
because they ultimately fail to properly balance the interests of the 
global community with the need for private property rights.  
Generally, space law has been treated differently than other types 
of international law, and an analogy to it most likely needs to be 
substantially reworked to fit the context and special character of 
space law.107  The tension between incentivizing the private 
development and protecting the interests of humanity continues to 
pose problems in both regimes.  The drafters of both understood 
the tension and attempted to find a middle ground, but both have 
instituted measures that are too pro-community, at the expense of 
development. 
The high seas regime comes closest to the type of scenario 
in the outer space context, but it fails to properly balance 
incentives to develop with community interests. The law of the sea 
deals primarily with the extraction of resources and the ownership 
of those resources, but provides that those how invest in the 
extraction of those resources must pay out to those that did not 
invest in a misguided attempt to uphold the principle of the benefit 
for all humanity.  The system of redistribution of the wealth that is 
acquired from the seabed is not an appropriate solution because it 
harms the incentive to develop.  In addition, the transaction costs 
and practicality of the entire regime make it untenable—which it in 
fact is.   It also focuses on national sovereignty, i.e. dividing up 
territory.  Although Rosanna Sattler’s proposal to transfer the 
concept of the EEZ to the outer space regime is appealing, it 
ultimately fails to deal with the underlying issue.  One serious 
question she fails to address is how the EEZs would be 
apportioned on a celestial body?  There is no national “baseline” or 
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starting point by which to measure the EEZ from.  However, 
fixtures or structures that have become immoveables on the 
celestial body might serve as a starting point. 
Another inadequacy in this analogy is that the status of 
natural resources in the law of the sea context is conceptually 
different than the status of natural resources in space law.  The 
main difference is in the weight carried by the common heritage of 
all mankind principle.  The common heritage principle is 
conceived of in general terms in the Moon Treaty; and the legal 
regime implementing it was not developed.108  UNCLOS is very 
detailed in its explanation of the common heritage principles and 
procedures.  This can be explained by the strong bargaining power 
of the developing countries in the UNCLOS process, and the 
relatively immanency of actual seabed exploitation.109  Art. II.7 of 
the Moon Treaty equates the special consideration of the “interests 
and needs of developing countries” to the efforts of those countries 
which have contributed to the exploration of the Moon, namely 
developed nations.  The common heritage principle 
implementation criteria of the Moon Treaty in Art. 11.7 are meant 
to distinguish it from that of the law of the sea context.110   
The Antarctic treaties deal more with sovereignty than it 
does private property rights.  Private property rights would come 
from the state sovereign. In 1960, President Eisenhower expressed 
the view that the Antarctica Treaty should be used as a model for 
the new legal regime for outer space.111  Although it was used as a 
model for space, the way it approaches the tension between the 
community and individual, forecloses any development of the 
individual, especially after the Madrid Protocol.  The Protocol 
forecloses all development thus foreclosing any development at 
this time.  The failures of both of these systems to provide 
adequate guidance necessitates the creation of a new approach to 
addressing the tension between the interests of the community and 
incentivizing develop by private entities. 
 
V. SOLUTION: THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NORM AND A NEW TREATY 
 
The ambiguity of the current regime must be resolved as 
humanity prepares to venture into space with more energy and 
ambition.  The ambiguity lies in how we characterize the 
background condition on which concepts of property rights in 
outer space operate.  As discussed with the terrestrial analogs, the 
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status of the extraterritorial space is crucial in determining whether 
private ownership is possible.  The background legal regime needs 
to be revamped and new approaches to core problems need to be 
incorporated. 
To address the tension between the desire to spur the 
development of resources on the various celestial bodies hurdling 
throughout the solar system, and the desire to protect the 
community’s interest in those very resources, a new conception of 
private property rights needs to be imported into the outer space 
legal regime.  This new import will serve as a bridge to cross the 
divide between the interests of the community and the interests of 
private development to produce a solution that allows for both to 
survive and remain protected.  This new conception finds a basis in 
the principle of using the outer space for the good of all mankind 
and it can be planted within the grant of private property rights.  
Therefore the new import will allow us to characterize celestial 
bodies as an open access common without sacrificing any ambition 
to protect the “for all mankind” aspirations of the drafters of the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
 
A. A Social-Obligation Norm: An Attempt to Balance 
Interests 
 
Private property rights should be explicitly defined using a 
strong social-obligation norm.  Using this norm in the definition 
will allow for private property, but still appeal to the drafters’ 
“benefit for all” desires.  It would appeal to the “common heritage 
of man” and developing states interests.  Wayne N. White calls for 
a limited form of property rights in space and the social-obligation 
norm would satisfy this desire by creating inherent limits that are 
based on the benefit to all mankind principle.112  A social-
obligation norm of property is based on the Aristotelian notion that 
humans are inherently social and dependent on one another.113  
This dependency is essential to the successful flourishing of a 
person and the community should foster this flourishing.114  An 
individual is able to flourish by using her property rights to acquire 
resources, and those rights are vindicated by the community 
against the encroachment of others.115  However, if the holder of 
the rights tries to assert her rights in a way that harms the 
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flourishing of the community, then the community will not 
vindicate that claim.116  This failure to vindicate the claim that was 
inconsistent with the flourishing of the community does not 
diminish the rights of the owner because the rights of the owner 
only include those that are consistent with flourishing of the 
community.117  The inherent limit on an individual’s property 
rights spring out of this social-obligation norm that is based on the 
well-being of the community.  This theory of property rights is a 
useful bridge bringing together the concepts of exploitation and 
private enterprise with the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind and benefit for all.   
On the Moon or other celestial body, the “community” is 
all of humanity.  It is different than a plot of land in Ithaca, New 
York where there is a defined community that is affected by the 
property right.  In an attenuated sense, that land in Ithaca may 
affect the community in a larger since, i.e. affecting community 
members in New York City or even in Tokyo, in the sense that we 
are all connected.  However, expanding the community in that 
context would seem inappropriate.  The community that is directly 
affected by the property right is the community that is key.  In the 
case of outer space, the relevant community starts out as all of 
humanity.  This may change over time, for instance if a separate 
community develops on a celestial body to a point where it 
becomes the relevant recipient of the affects of the property rights.  
Nonetheless, at this point in time the relevant community for outer 
space rights is the global community.  Thus, on a celestial body the 
private individual cannot make valid claims to rights that adversely 
affect the community. 
Defining private property rights in outer space with an 
inherent social-obligation norm allows us to characterize celestial 
bodies like the Moon as terra nullius, avoiding the stifling affects 
of characterizing it as the common heritage of mankind.  
Characterizing celestial bodies as an open access common would 
allow for a first possession type of property acquisition.  Allowing 
individual entities to acquire property rights by first possession, in 
much the same way as discovering a new continent on Earth, will 
incentivize colonization or development by prompting interested 
entities to compete to be the first to occupy and utilize the celestial 
bodies.118  Competition to acquire property rights on a celestial 
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body would prompt only the most able or the most willing to take 
the risk to attempt to develop the celestial body.  This should 
prompt a relatively efficient allocation of property rights on 
celestial bodies based on the most capable and successful entity to 
first possess the land or resource on the celestial body. 
Nonetheless, proponents of the common heritage of 
mankind conception of the background condition on celestial 
bodies will argue that an open access common will result in a 
number of undesirable results, most succinctly embodied in the 
tragedy of the commons,119 which is argued as a reason why 
celestial bodies should not be characterized as terra nullius.  
However, the inherent social obligation norm deals with the 
tragedy of the commons problem by forcing the individual 
property owners to internalize the costs of their actions, which 
violate the norm.  The tragedy of the commons arises in situations 
where an open access system exists and, for instance, entities act to 
extract a finite resource from the open access system.120  When an 
entity extracts the resource, that entity gets all the benefit of the 
extracted resource, but only shares a fraction of the cost of the 
depleted resource pool, which is shared amongst all the entities 
participating.  The tragedy arises from the fact that externalities on 
the environment and others are not internalized, and thus a 
resource gathering entity will have no incentive to curb wasteful 
consumption.  The social obligation norm short-circuits this by 
internalizing negative externalities by defining the scope of 
property rights in terms of a social obligation to the community as 
a whole.  Therefore, with a redefined conception of private 
property, development can be incentivized while addressing the 
worries of a tragedy of the commons as humanity expands into the 
reaches of space. 
 
B. A New Treaty 
 
Many solutions to the problem of private property rights on 
celestial bodies have been provided by scholars.  Unfortunately 
because technology and funding have not made the issue one that 
needs immediate resolution, proposed solutions wait until the 
theories are tested by practice and need in the future.  There are 
plenty of solutions to the problems posed by the uncertainty of 
property rights in celestial territory that do not require an overhaul 
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of the legal space regime.  Slight additions and amendments to the 
current regime are far more favorable to address property concerns 
than are drastic upheaval of settled legal norms.121 The 
International Institute of Space Law advocates for the creation of a 
specific regime for the exploitation of such resources through the 
United Nations.122  The Institute states that the purposes of such a 
creation are clarity and legal certainty.123 As was wisely stated, 
“[T]he utility of law can be measured in large part by its certainty 
[. . .].”124  More clarification is needed because the existing treaty 
system was based on cold war norms, which no longer apply, and 
because of the growing importance of private enterprises in the 
space industry as a result of the Obama administration’s new 
approach to NASA’s funding in favor of private ventures.  
Creating a new treaty is in line with the practice in this 
area, i.e. there are a number of treaties that make up the main body 
of space law.  Those advocating for the withdraw of the U.S. from 
the Outer Space Treaty fail to understand the legal scope of the 
main principles of the treaty.125  Article II of the treaty has likely 
passed into international customary law, as discussed earlier.  
Therefore, even non-parties to the Outer Space Treaty are bound 
by the principles that have passed into customary international law, 
one of which being Article II.126  A more practical and appropriate 
solution would be to create a multilateral treaty, similar to the other 
space law treaties, dealing particularly with the property rights of 
private actors.  This “Property Treaty” should guarantee property 
rights to private actors, and craft that content of the property right 
using the social-obligation norm.  Using the social-obligation norm 
as a more robust, positive theory of property over a “thin” and 
negative theory of property found in most liberal legal systems 
would appeal to a wider array of nations prompting more 
acceptance of the Property Treaty.   
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There will nonetheless be resistance against a “Property 
Treaty” from countries that either oppose private property rights, 
like communist countries, or are considered developing countries.  
The communist countries may object to a Property Treaty on 
ideological grounds.  However, this may not prove to be much of 
an obstacle given the modern acceptance of limited property rights 
in communist countries like China.  Since the end of the cold war, 
capitalism and its tenets of private property have become the 
global paradigm.  Also the developing countries would likely 
object to this new treaty out of fear that the powerful, first-world 
corporations will exploit the riches of the solar system further 
enriching the rich and leaving the poor behind. 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS)127 would be the optimal forum for any revisions 
or debates regarding a new treaty given its role as the implementer 
and overseer of the outer space treaties.  The sixty-seven member 
nations of COPUOS include the main space-faring nations in the 
world—providing a ready forum for discussion.  The Legal 
Subcommittee of COPUOS can take up the proposed “Property 
Treaty” for state discussion and hopefully ratification.  The 
committee has already expressed interest in dealing with the debate 
over property rights.128  Therefore, the mechanisms for the creation 
of a new treaty are already available for use. 
 
C. The Inadequacy of Interim Measures 
 
Some commentators on the subject of property rights on 
celestial bodies advocate for interim solutions until a new multi-
lateral treaty is created.  Some point to the Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources Act (Seabed Act),129 as an example of a 
domestic measure that tries to bridge the gap in the deep sea 
mining context.130  The Seabed Act serves as a legal regime for 
U.S. private entities to rely on in their deep sea ventures.  The Act 
essentially duplicates the requirements under the UNCLOS regime, 
e.g. undersea mining companies apply for permits and licenses, 
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and must conduct their exploitation in a manner that gives 
“reasonable regard to the interests of other states.”131  Members of 
the Senate have even objected to ascension to UNCLOS because 
the Seabed Act provides for all the benefits under UNCLOS 
without the additional costs.132  The Act was created to provide 
protection to U.S. interests while the U.S. considered the 
ratification of UNCLOS.   
Using the Seabed Act as an example of what can be done in 
the outer space realm misses a key difference.  First, in the law of 
the sea context there is a legal regime firmly established to deal 
with extraterritorial property rights.  Part XI and the 1994 
Agreement setup a widely recognized regime for the exploitation 
of the Area, while in the outer space context there is no such 
regime.  UNCLOS is much more robust than the outer space 
treaties and there is great ambiguity whether there even is a right to 
private property rights on celestial bodies.  Second, given this 
ambiguity, it would be unwise for a nation to unilaterally create a 
regime of property rights on celestial bodies without first settling 
the fundamental question of whether property rights are 
permissible.  Although unilateral action by a major space-faring 
nation like the U.S. may prompt the international community to act 
in revising the outer space treaty regime, it may also cause undue 
conflict with other nations that may disagree with the domestic 
implementation.133  Multi-lateral talks would best take into account 
the interests of a wide array of nations and peoples to balance the 
interests of the community.  Therefore, using the Seabed Act as an 
example of how to address the issue of property rights in outer 
space is ill advised. 
Rosanna Sattler points to the Commercial Space Act134 as 
an analogous type of domestic legislation to the Seabed Act that 
attempts to fill out the gaps in an international legal regime, 
namely the International Space Station Intergovernmental 
Agreement (IGA).135  Nonetheless, this example suffers from the 
same deficiencies that apply to the Seabed Act.  In addition, the 
IGA does not address the issue of property rights that is at issue in 
this paper.  The IGA ensures that each country will retain 
ownership and control of each physical module and all activities 
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and personnel within the module.136  This is not an advancement 
and provides no clarification for private property rights on celestial 
bodies.  It is a well-accepted rule in the outer space treaty system, 
as well as in the law of the sea, that a ship or vessel remains under 
the control of the “flag state.”137  The IGA merely governs the use 
of the International Space Station and reaffirms the customary 
norms of ownership and jurisdiction that currently exist in 
international law.  Looking to the IGA or any domestic legislation 
expanding on it is an inadequate approach.  Therefore, no proposed 
interim provision yet proposed seems to address the fundamental 
ambiguities relating to property rights in the Outer Space Treaty. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 A limited form of private property rights in celestial 
territory, namely functional rights, are probably permissible under 
the current regime.  To reduce ambiguity in an effort to incentivize 
commercial development of celestial bodies, another international 
agreement outlining the very basic protections to property rights 
should be created.  When developing what rights a private actor 
would have, the guiding principle of the common heritage of 
mankind should be incorporated into the recognized property rights 
as a social obligation norm. 
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